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Reply to Symposiasts 












AFTER ITS PUBLICATION, HUME LAMENTED 
that A Treatise of Human Nature «fell dead-
born from the press».1 I thank the editors of 
the Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psico-
logia and the symposium contributors for en-
suring that Humean Nature receives a more 
lively reception.  
First I’ll respond to Carla Bagnoli’s classic 
anti-Humean arguments for the authority of 
reason over desire. Second, I’ll consider Nevia 
Dolcini’s exploration of issues concerning 
moral judgment that are central to my pro-
ject’s philosophical significance. Third, I’ll en-
gage with Kengo Miyazono’s clear and fo-
cused discussion of vividness. Fourth, I’ll ad-
dress Alex King’s illuminating questions about 
how mental states combine in reasoning. 
 
█ Bagnoli and the authority of reason 
 
Carla Bagnoli advances the classic objec-
tion that Humeans neglect the influence of 
normative reasoning over desire. Noting 
Kant’s distinction between pure reason and 
empirical practical reason, she argues that 
«desires as well as any other unreflective el-
ements in our mind do not exercise their au-
thority directly: they do so under the guise of 
incentives that have to be assessed by reason-
ing».2 She similarly agrees with Scanlon that 
«the explanatory power of desires ultimately 
depends on the fact that they work as norma-
tive items whose normativity is taken for 
granted».3 
If empirical evidence suggests that the ex-
planatory power of desire in is dependent on 
rational assessment of its normative status, 
it’ll support the anti-Humean psychological 
commitment that Kant, Scanlon, and Bagnoli 
share. But if the evidence turns out other-
wise, it suggests that they’ve overstated the 
significance of rational assessment. The 
Kantian claim explicitly concerns how our 
minds work, and if Scanlon’s theory is to ap-
ply to human desires, it’ll need to accurately 
characterize what happens in our minds as 
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well. So I’ll evaluate these claims by seeing 
whether they accord with what we know 
about how humans act, think, and feel.  
Bagnoli argues that the Humean Theory 
«cannot explain how one is motivated by a 
desire that regards more important, even 
though less intense».4 She illustrates the ob-
jection with the case of Al on his spaceship, 
desiring to immediately consume all the re-
sources, but restraining himself with an evalu-
ative judgment that he shouldn’t do so be-
cause the resources need to be saved for the 
future or shared with others (Bagnoli presents 
the case both ways). Anti-Humean views 
might treat the evaluative judgment as a be-
lief produced by reason which accompanies 
the less intense desire to resist temptation, 
and which prevents Al’s more intense desire 
to consume the resources from being effec-
tive. How can a less intense desire motivate 
Al to overcome his desire to consume the re-
sources, on a Humean picture?  
Many Humean explanations are available, 
and clarifying what “less intense” means would 
narrow things down. If Bagnoli means that the 
desire motivating Al to resist temptation has a 
less intense emotional phenomenology, appeal-
ing to differential vividness lets Humeans ex-
plain how it would still motivate Al. Following 
Hume’s discussion of calm and violent pas-
sions, stronger desires may have a less intense 
emotional phenomenology than the weaker de-
sires they overpower, if the stronger desires’ ob-
jects are less vividly represented. As future ben-
efits and benefits to others are often less vividly 
represented than immediate benefits to oneself, 
Al might resist immediate temptation even 
while its vividness creates a more vivid emo-
tional phenomenology. Moreover, if he has a 
desire to do what’s important (de dicto), Al’s 
belief about importance could be part of a de-
sire-belief pair motivating him to do what’s 
important. A strong desire can be overcome by 
two weaker desires working together. 
There are many Humean explanations of 
how to resist temptation and choose one’s 
acknowledged greater good. Depending on 
the specifics of the case, such explanations 
might invoke strong desires in the absence of 
vivid representations, de dicto desires for val-
uable states of affairs, or willpower. Al’s mo-
tivation may come from a desire to save re-
sources for the future, an aversion to depriv-
ing others, or a desire to do what’s most im-
portant. If a desire of this kind is stronger 
than Al’s desire to consume the resources 
even when the appeal of consuming is vivid, 
Al will refrain from consuming them. 
The Humean Theory doesn’t allow belief 
about the importance of a weaker desire, by 
itself, to let it overpower a stronger desire. 
This lets Humeans accurately predict irra-
tional behaviors like procrastination where 
people pursue vividly represented temptations 
despite judging them to be less important. 
Humean Nature argues that Scanlon’s theory 
can’t accurately predict these phenomena, 
precisely because he gives evaluative judgment 
too much control over desire. Bagnoli doesn’t 
explain how Scanlon’s view can be rescued 
from this empirical disconfirmation.  
The empirical facts about people like Al 
support explanations in terms of desire over 
explanations where evaluative beliefs moti-
vate by themselves. The kinds of people who 
can resist temptation and not consume the 
resources would also feel bad if they discov-
ered that they had left nothing for the future 
or for others. Generalizations like this He-
donic Correlation suggest that Al’s motiva-
tion comes from desire than from belief. De-
sires cause displeasure when combined with 
thoughts of failing to attain what’s desired – 
this is the Hedonic Aspect. In the absence of 
desire, beliefs have no such systematic con-
nection to hedonic phenomenology. This is 
how empirical evidence from first-personal 
hedonic phenomenology supports Humean 
accounts of motivation over Kantian ac-
counts.  
Why do our actions so often align with 
our evaluative beliefs? Bagnoli anticipates a 
Humean explanation on which “the evalua-
tion is nothing but a desire”. This noncogni-
tivist position is a traditional Humean op-
tion, but the emotional perception model in-
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stead suggests cognitivism about evaluative 
judgment. Emotional dispositions contain 
desires, and activating them causes hedon-
ically charged feelings which cause beliefs. 
Just as color experience causes color belief, 
emotional experience causes evaluative be-
lief. This lets Humeans treat evaluative 
judgments as beliefs, while regarding the ac-
companying motivation as driven by the de-
sires at the heart of emotional dispositions.  
Evaluative judgment is tied closely to ef-
fects of desire like motivation, emotion, and 
the direction of attention. So it’s understand-
able that Bagnoli, Kant, and Scanlon see 
evaluative judgment as regulating desire’s ef-
fects. Humean Nature argues that they have 
things backwards – desire explains evaluative 
judgment. The Humean view fits into a sim-
ple and unified explanation of a vast range of 
psychological phenomena, including resisting 
temptation, acting against our acknowledged 
greater good, feeling good about the things 
we’re motivated to attain, and forming be-
liefs on the basis of experience. If the views 
Bagnoli shares with her distinguished prede-
cessors can be integrated into a psychological 
theory of similar simplicity and explanatory 
power, no one has shown how. The authority 
of evaluative judgment over desire then 
seems like the ability of chemical processes to 
turn lead into gold – a figment of an obsolete 
theory that should be banished from our pic-
ture of the world.  
 
█  Dolcini and moral judgment 
 
Nevia Dolcini considers my account of 
moral judgment, which encompasses two of 
the most significant ideas in Humean Nature 
– the emotional perception model and expe-
rientialism. She considers two broad issues. 
First, she argues that some of the distinctions 
I draw in developing my account of moral 
judgment compromise the simplicity of the 
Humean Theory. Second, she explores the 
implications of my theory for psychopathy. 
As Dolcini notes, the emotional percep-
tion model treats moral beliefs as typically 
generated by emotional experience, but also 
by testimony and reasoning. She’s right that 
the model gives moral beliefs directly pro-
duced by experience a closer relation to ac-
tion than those produced by testimony or 
reasoning. This helps to explain why most 
people are motivated to act in accordance 
with their moral beliefs, and also why others 
who lack the relevant emotions can form still 
moral beliefs through testimony and reason-
ing without the accompanying motivation. 
Psychopaths are agents of the latter kind, and 
are often invoked in arguments against in-
ternalist theories that treat intrinsic motiva-
tional force as essential to moral judgment.  
Dolcini thinks I’ve sacrificed the simplicity 
of the Humean Theory in explaining these 
phenomena. She describes my view as follows: 
«Moral beliefs not originated from experience 
are very dissimilar from those caused by expe-
rience: only the latter possess motivational 
force, whereas the former are motivationally 
inert».5 She thinks I posit «two different sorts 
of concepts, namely, concepts with or without 
motivational force» and argues that this 
«leads to the undesirable result that the catego-
ry of concepts lacks homogeneity».6 Invoking 
two different sets of moral concepts, one that 
conferred motivational force on beliefs and one 
that didn’t, would indeed be undesirably com-
plex. I would’ve been embarrassed to include 
such an inelegant theory in Humean Nature. 
Moreover, giving any beliefs motivational force 
would violate the Humean Theory. 
Here Dolcini misunderstands the emo-
tional perception model. It doesn’t ascribe 
intrinsic motivational force to any beliefs, no 
matter how they’re formed or which con-
cepts they contain.7 Whenever motivational 
force accompanies belief, it comes from a de-
sire that accompanies the belief and not from 
the belief alone. In the cases at hand, these 
desires are constituents of our emotional dis-
positions which give emotion its motivation-
al force and explain its hedonic phenomenol-
ogy. So when a moral belief is formed from 
experience, the desire that explains the expe-
rience can also motivate action. When testi-
  Sinhababu 
 
98 
mony or reasoning are needed to generate 
moral belief because emotional experience is 
absent, that’s a sign of desire’s absence, sug-
gesting that we won’t be accordingly moti-
vated. In short, the emotional perception 
model maintains a simple and unified con-
ception of belief by letting the presence or 
absence of desire explain the presence or ab-
sence of motivation.  
Dolcini also argues that experientialism 
also offends against simplicity in its «re-
course to the notion of accuracy».8 Experien-
tialism defines virtues as character traits ob-
jectively represented by accurate admiration. 
Other moral properties like goodness and 
wrongness are similarly defined as the things 
objectively represented by accurate feelings 
of hope and guilt. She notes that this analysis 
leaves many questions unanswered, such as 
such as “what makes a moral feeling accu-
rate?” and “how to distinguish between accu-
rate vs. inaccurate feelings?” The only direct 
answer I can offer here is purely definitional 
– a feeling is accurate if and only if the thing 
it represents is the way the feeling represents 
it.9 But substantive questions of what to ad-
mire are hard to answer. 
Invoking accuracy here doesn’t reduce the 
simplicity of the theory, as the theory isn’t 
committed to its existence of accuracy. It’s 
merely part of the experientialist definition 
of moral terms like “virtue”, “good,” and 
“wrong”. Definitions don’t commit us to the 
existence of the things defined or the things 
in terms of which we define them. An experi-
entialist could deny that accurate feelings of 
admiration, hope, and guilt are possible be-
cause there’s nothing in the world to make 
them accurate, and then hold that virtue, 
goodness, and wrongness don’t exist. This is 
error theory about morality, the view that all 
moral beliefs are false. 
The unanswered questions Dolcini poses 
are simply the classic questions of moral phi-
losophy, translated into experientialist lan-
guage. “What makes admiration accurate?” is 
a way to ask “Which character traits are ad-
mirable?” or “What are the virtues?” “How 
can I distinguish accurate and inaccurate 
guilt?” is another way of asking “How can I 
tell whether the actions that feel wrong to me 
really are wrong?” Experientialists can be er-
ror theorist and say that guilt and admiration 
are never accurate, since there’s no wrong-
ness or virtue. Experientialists can also be 
moral realists and say that reality includes 
objective moral facts that make these feelings 
accurate. Treating these objective moral facts 
as irreducible to scientific facts will indeed 
lead to a loss of simplicity. But on the reduc-
tionist form of moral realism I favor, the ac-
curacy-conditions for moral feeling can be 
explained entirely in terms of scientific facts, 
maintaining a simple ontology.10 
A psychological theory need not answer 
the questions of moral metaphysics or nor-
mative ethics. It should explain how we think 
about these questions, since our thoughts are 
part of our psychology. But the answers 
might lie outside our psychology, and finding 
them is a topic for substantive moral philos-
ophy. So it’s best to leave Dolcini’s unan-
swered questions to the moral philosophers.  
Now I turn to Dolcini’s discussion of psy-
chopaths. As suggested earlier, their lack of 
motivation to act rightly results from differ-
ences between their desires and ours, not dif-
ferences between their beliefs and ours. This 
is the standard Humean cognitivist treat-
ment of amoralists – they have moral beliefs 
just like everyone else, but they act different-
ly because they have different desires.  
Dolcini asks whether psychopaths and 
other amoralists can be held morally respon-
sible for their misdeeds. She writes, «if hu-
man morality depends upon the subjects’ ca-
pacity for experiencing feelings, how is it 
possible to claim the amoralist (morally) re-
sponsible for his or her despicable ac-
tions?».11 Experientialism treats psychopaths 
as unable to master moral concepts. They can 
only partially grasp the concepts through se-
mantic deference. So if mastering or non-
deferentially grasping moral concepts is nec-
essary for moral responsibility, they aren’t 
morally responsible for their actions.   
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I think psychopaths and other amoralists 
are morally responsible for their actions, as 
the ability to grasp moral concepts isn’t nec-
essary for moral responsibility. There’s no 
general problem with concepts applying to 
people who don’t grasp them – psychopaths 
need not have the concept of being psycho-
paths. The same holds for the concept of be-
ing morally praiseworthy. Creatures who 
never grasped the concept of rightness, 
goodness, virtue, or praise might still be 
praiseworthy if they fully grasped the con-
cept of pain and tried their best to prevent 
the pain of others. Ordinary people seem to 
agree that dogs who undergo personal risk to 
help other dogs are proper subjects of moral 
praise. Internet videos depicting animals 
helping other animals often have many 
comments praising the moral character of 
the benevolent animals. If this is right, and 
blame is like praise, psychopaths can be 
blameworthy despite not understanding 
what “blameworthy” means.  
Finally, Dolcini raises the issue of how to 
consider intelligent and successful psycho-
paths who act like ordinary people for self-
interested reasons despite lacking the moral 
feelings. In some cases, such psychopaths 
would do the same things that conscientious 
people would do, but for self-interested rea-
sons rather than moral reasons. Dolcini notes 
that my view requires a moral distinction be-
tween these two types of action. 
This distinction is one that moral philoso-
phers already know they need to draw. Im-
manuel Kant describes a shopkeeper who 
doesn’t cheat anyone, not for moral reasons 
but because a reputation for honest dealing is 
better for business than the profits of cheat-
ing. Moral theory since Kant has developed 
many ways to draw this distinction, and the 
same distinction will deal with successful psy-
chopaths. Maybe conscientious people act 
rightly while psychopaths act wrongly. Or 
maybe (on the view I favor) both act rightly, 
but only the conscientious people’s actions 
have moral worth. Either way, categorizing 
successful psychopaths requires no new moral 
distinctions – only well-understood ones at 
the core of contemporary ethical theory. So 
the Humean Theory leaves us no worse than 
before. 
 
█ Miyazono on vividness 
 
Following Hume, I use desire’s interac-
tion with vivid sensory and imaginative rep-
resentations to explain a variety of psycho-
logical phenomena. But I don’t give a precise 
account of what vividness is, introducing it 
largely with examples. After noting these 
points, Kengo Miyazono provides a helpful 
discussion of how I might provide a clearer 
account of vividness and its role in psycho-
logical explanation. 
Vividness is a matter of degree. Some rep-
resentations are more vivid than others on 
what seems like a continuous scale. Moreover, 
the effects of increasing vividness on desire, 
emotion, and motivation seem to vary contin-
uously. So an account of vividness might iden-
tify the psychological states and processes that 
increase the vividness of representations when 
their magnitudes increase. Our final psycho-
logical theory might have precise mathemati-
cal rules for quantifying these factors, incor-
porating them into a calculus that determines 
a representation’s degree of vividness. It’ll be a 
long time before this can be worked out with 
any sort of precision. So the most I can do is to 
consider which factors might go into such a 
vividness calculus.  
Miyazono helps with this task by present-
ing several hypotheses concerning how I 
might understand the levels of vividness that 
various representations have. I like a version 
of the first hypothesis he suggests: that sen-
sory representations are typically more vivid 
than imaginative representations. We might 
understand imaginative representations as 
being on a continuum where the most vivid 
ones are sensation-like. Less vivid imagina-
tive representations fall short of sensation-
like vividness to varying degrees.    
Attention’s effects on vividness compli-
cate this picture. The more I attend to par-
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ticular sensed or imagined things, the more 
their vividness rises. We exercise willpower 
by exploiting this relationship between atten-
tion and vividness. One can resist a tempta-
tion by directing attention away from it and 
towards a long-term goal. In Hume’s termi-
nology, this calms the passion for the tempta-
tion, and raises the violence of the passion 
for the long-term goal. Perhaps in some suc-
cessful exercises of willpower, the imagina-
tive representation of the long-term goal be-
comes more vivid than the sensory represen-
tation of the temptation.  
Attending to a representation increases its 
vividness. I would need a better theory of the 
relationship between attention and vividness to 
accurately describe how this happens. It seems 
natural to regard sensory representations as 
having a baseline level of vividness, to which 
attention contributes further. Do imaginative 
representations similarly have baseline levels to 
which attention contributes? Or does the de-
gree of attentional focus partly constitute the 
vividness of an imaginative representation? 
Perhaps imagination constitutively involves at-
tention to a possible state of affairs that isn’t 
being sensed. Whatever the relationship be-
tween attention and imagination may be, at-
tending to what is represented increases the 
vividness of the representation.  
A second hypothesis Miyozono offers is 
that «vividness has something to do with visu-
al modality (and possibly other sensory modali-
ties)».12 I don’t quite understand what this hy-
pothesis amounts to. Everything, I suppose, has 
something to do with everything else. I should 
note in passing that vividness should apply to 
sensory modalities other than vision. The more 
intense the aroma of the freshly baked bread, 
the more I may want to eat it. In any event, 
Miyozono opposes this hypothesis to the idea 
that vividness comes in degrees. He rightly 
notes that this would make it unacceptable for 
my purposes. 
I like Miyazono’s third hypothesis that 
«vividness has something to do with particu-
larity».13 Particular things are indeed usually 
more amenable to vivid representation than 
abstract things. I can vividly imagine the taste 
of Guinness, the final lyrics of Wolf Parade’s 
“Yulia”, and my mother’s face. But I can’t so 
vividly imagine taste, sounds, or faces in gen-
eral without imagining a particular taste, 
sound, or face. Miyazono notes that my exam-
ple of procrastinating on Facebook rather than 
finishing my book manuscript leaves the appeal 
of Facebook too general. Such a general repre-
sentation would be unlikely to motivate pro-
crastination. That’s why the example briefly 
became more particular: «I’m refreshing Face-
book to see who liked a joke I made or continu-
ing an interminable argument with a libertari-
an. What’s vivid to me is the amusement of 
others at my joke, or the wrongness of his op-
position to Keynesian countercyclical stimu-
lus».14 (It would’ve been even more vivid if I’d 
told the joke or quoted the libertarian.)  
What is the fundamental relationship be-
tween vividness, particularity, and desire? Per-
haps particularity is essential to vividness, so 
that a more vivid representation just is one that 
fills in more particular details. Perhaps it’s a 
quirk of our sensory and imaginative capacities 
that they’re suited to vividly representing par-
ticulars. Perhaps the objects of desire appear 
primarily in particular forms, making represen-
tations of particulars especially effective in am-
plifying desires. Many other hypotheses are 
worth considering, and perhaps future psy-
chologists will test them.  
Miyazono also asks, “In virtue of what is 
Facebook more vivid than the book manu-
script?” This depends largely on situational fac-
tors. The joke or the argument might be more 
vivid if I engaged with them more recently. 
And if Facebook is open in front of me, its viv-
idness will make it hard to tear myself away. 
But if I’m immersed in writing, intriguing theo-
retical questions may be more vivid to me, am-
plifying my desire to write. Thanks to Miyazo-
no, that’s my situation now. 
Miyazono questions whether my compli-
cated account of desire strength is consistent 
with a functionalist picture of desire. My ac-
counts of practical rationality and motivation 
incorporate two different ways of understand-
Reply to Symposiasts 
 
101 
ing desire strength. While this is indeed com-
plex, I don’t see any better way for functional-
ists to accommodate the complex phenomena 
surrounding vividness. I’ll try to explain this 
more clearly.  
If vivid representations aren’t in play, the 
inputs to motivation are the (baseline) strength 
of desire and the subjective probability that act-
ing will bring about the desired outcome. Mul-
tiplying these values gives the motivational 
force of the desire-belief pair. All this is a 
standard part of a functionalist account of de-
sire.  
How does Amplification by Vividness fit in-
to this motivational calculus? Just as function-
alists understand desires and beliefs as inputs to 
a motivational calculus where the output is in-
tention, they can understand desires and vivid 
representations of their objects as inputs to a 
process where the output is temporary amplifi-
cation of the desire’s strength. To calculate de-
sire’s strength as it enters into the motivational 
calculus, take the desire’s baseline strength (the 
strength when there are no vivid representa-
tions of the object) and add the degree of am-
plification. Calculating this requires thinking of 
two different levels of strength – a baseline lev-
el that leaves out the effects of vividness and a 
final level that includes them.  
The effects of vividness help to predict what 
people actually do, but not what it’s rational to 
do. If it’s rational for me to press on with writ-
ing my book when the attractions of procrasti-
nation aren’t vivid, it’s similarly rational when 
the attractions of procrastination are vivid. If 
you agree, you’ll see the point of using only the 
baseline values for assessing the normative 
questions of practical rationality. This explains 
what it’s rational to do, and also how people 
can fail to do what’s rational.  
The final topic Miyazono discusses is 
alief. The differences in clarity between my 
account of desire and Tamar Gendler’s ac-
count of alief are larger than he suggests. 
While my account indeed leaves “vividness” 
undefined, this term at least excludes some 
things. Gendler’s exhaustive disjunctions like 
“consciously or nonconsciously” in defining 
alief don’t exclude anything.  
Miyazono offers two criticisms of how I 
handle Gendler’s Grand Canyon Skywalk case. 
First he writes, «I don’t know why the ampli-
fied desire not to fall is not overwhelmed by the 
belief that the Skywalk is safe». He draws a 
comparison to my case where someone desires 
to eat a delicious-looking fruit, but has seen 
someone else get sick after eating it, and avoids 
eating the fruit out of a stronger aversion to 
getting sick. His suggestion seems to be that the 
belief that the Skywalk is safe should determine 
one’s action, like the belief that the fruit will 
make one sick. 
These cases are disanalogous, because it’s 
hard to see what desire would interact with 
the belief about the Skywalk’s safety to moti-
vate walking on it. The belief that the fruit 
will make one sick helps to determine one’s 
motivation because one is averse to being 
sick. But while people have aversions to 
walking on unsafe things, they don’t in gen-
eral have positive desires to walk on safe 
things. It would be strange if someone be-
came gleeful at the sight of a safe thing to 
walk on. So it’s hard to see how the belief 
that the Skywalk is safe would combine with 
a desire to positively motivate walking.  
Miyazono’s second criticism is more in-
teresting. He notes that my account relies on 
the vividly represented drop amplifying one’s 
aversion to walking. But doesn’t something 
there also amplify one’s positive desire to 
walk? After all, people came so far specifical-
ly to walk on the Skywalk – aren’t the desired 
features of walking there also vivid to them? 
Maybe they don’t positively desire to walk on 
something safe, but they must desire some-
thing else. Why isn’t this desired thing vivid 
to the same degree as the terrifying drop, 
making them enjoy the walk? 
My account requires that the desired 
thing isn’t so vividly represented in the mo-
ment of walking. This desired thing will dif-
fer from person to person. I don’t know what 
it is in general. Perhaps some go to escape 
boredom; some go for the memory of having 
walked; and some go for the feeling of ac-
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complishment when they finish. (Recall the 
words on the souvenir photographs: “I did 
it!!!”) Absences and retrospective future 
events are usually represented with less viv-
idness than present immediate things. So as 
they step out onto the Skywalk, the terrifying 
drop will be more vivid than whatever they 
desire. And then the greater effects of vivid-
ness on phenomenology than motivation will 
fill them with fear, even as they step hesitant-
ly onto the glass.  
 
█  King and the mechanics of reasoning 
 
Among the novel features of Humean Na-
ture is an account of how the Attentional As-
pect of desire makes mental states combine in 
reasoning. I thank Alex King for carefully 
mapping out ways that this account could be 
further developed. I’ll begin by discussing how 
combining works, and how inconsistent inten-
tions exclude each other. Then I’ll turn to 
questions about what makes particular mental 
processes count as reasoning.  
King helpfully articulates three ways of 
understanding what happens when a desire 
and a belief combine in instrumental reason-
ing. Are they like puzzle pieces, coming to-
gether but retaining their individual identi-
ties? Are they like parents of offspring, pro-
ducing a third thing distinct from the original 
two? Or are they like ingredients that go into a 
cake, ceasing to exist in their previous forms 
as a new thing is made? King identifies my 
view with the offspring model. She rightly 
notes that I see the original desire and belief as 
continuing to exist, and the new instrumental 
desire as existing as well.  
I see the new instrumental desire as a 
third thing composed of the original desire 
and belief that are now interlocked. This 
doesn’t fit the offspring model. Offspring 
typically aren’t composed of their interlocked 
parents. Can the portion of a puzzle com-
posed of two interlocking puzzle pieces itself 
be called a puzzle piece? If so, putting puzzle 
pieces together provides an analogy for in-
strumental reasoning as I usually describe it. 
If not, putting them together provides an 
analogy for instrumental reasoning only on 
the terminological variant that I call the in-
trinsic-desires-only view. This view awards 
the name “desire” only to intrinsic desires, 
which helps to prevent double-counting in 
calculating psychological effects, but doesn’t 
match the ordinary tendency to call instru-
mental desires “desires”. I make the termino-
logical choice to set it aside: «For ease of ex-
position, I’ll still write of instrumental de-
sires, but “combinations of intrinsic desires 
and means-end beliefs” is all I mean».15 
The way phrases combine provides a bet-
ter analogy for instrumental reasoning as I 
usually discuss it. Phrases continue existing 
and being phrases when they’re combined 
with other phrases to become parts of new 
phrases. Desires continue existing and being 
desires when they’re combined with beliefs to 
become parts of new desires. “See you” keeps 
existing and being a phrase when “in the fu-
ture” is appended to it. “See you in the future” 
is also a phrase, partly because “See you” is a 
phrase. Similarly, a desire to eat keeps existing 
and being a desire after it combines with a be-
lief about the means to eat. The resulting de-
sire for the means is also a desire, partly be-
cause the desire for the end is.  
Understanding combinations of desire like 
combinations of phrases helps to understand 
what happens when new intentions are formed. 
King writes that intention-formation as I de-
scribe it «doesn’t produce a new mental state, 
but simply brings existing mental states togeth-
er».16 But if mental states are like phrases, 
combining them creates a further mental state 
composed of the previously existing mental 
states. This is how I understand the generation 
of intentions and instrumental desires in prac-
tical reasoning. King rightly argues that I 
should understand both types of reasoning the 
same way. In fact, I do.  
King raises another important issue about 
my account of intention. I explain our tenden-
cy not to form inconsistent intentions in terms 
of our tendency to form beliefs that intended 
events will occur. These beliefs prevent the 
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formation of inconsistent intentions – I can’t 
intend to board the plane at 7:30 and also be-
lieve that I’ll see you in town at 8. But what 
prevents us from forming inconsistent inten-
tions when the subjective probability of satis-
faction is low? Then our beliefs won’t screen 
off inconsistent intentions. She writes: 
 
[Sinhababu] discusses the case of a bas-
ketball player who believes that his mak-
ing a halfcourt shot is unlikely. In such a 
case, why should exclusion take hold at 
all? What precludes the player’s intending 
something else that is conflicting, but un-
likely, since after all he doesn’t believe that 
either of them will occur?17  
 
Indeed, my desire-belief theory correctly 
predicts that the player could form conflict-
ing intentions of this sort. I thank King for 
calling this to readers’ attention, and I’ll illus-
trate it with an example. 
Suppose the shooter knows that an oppo-
nent standing near the basket has an obscure 
psychological disorder: if a player screams 
very loudly while shooting the ball, the op-
ponent will grab the shooter’s teammate and 
throw him into the air in front of the basket. 
This will block the path of the ball and pre-
vent it from going in, but such manhandling 
will constitute a foul on the opponent and 
enable the shooter’s team to win. Suppose the 
shooter thinks his chance of screaming loud 
enough to cause the foul is as low as his 
chance of making the shot. If screaming 
won’t distract him from shooting, his best 
option is to scream while shooting, with the 
intention of making the opponent throw his 
teammate. Then he intends the ball to go in 
the basket, and also intends something that 
would ensure that the ball doesn’t go into the 
basket. Such conflicting intentions are psy-
chologically possible (and rational) in low-
probability cases. If other theories of inten-
tion don’t make this prediction, this is a 
point against them.  
Now I’ll turn to another important set of 
questions King raises: Why do particular men-
tal states come together in reasoning, and 
which mental processes count as reasoning? 
These questions concern fundamental issues 
where my explanations come to an end. For-
tunately, my Humean project can achieve its 
psychological and metaethical goals even if I 
have little more to say here.  
King first notes that I don’t have much of 
a story about why particular mental states 
combine to generate others. As she writes, 
«if we want to know why this desire com-
bines with this belief and why it produces 
that desire, it looks like we must be content 
with the answer that this is simply how 
things are».18 To illustrate: desire combines 
with belief about which events would raise 
the probability of satisfaction, composing in-
strumental desire for these events. Such de-
sire-belief combinations don’t compose in-
strumental desire for these events not to 
happen, or generate beliefs that the events 
are impossible. Why do these mental states 
combine as they do, and not in other ways?  
Here we reach the basic laws of (intention-
al-state) psychology, which no deeper psycho-
logical laws explain. That desires and beliefs 
combine this way is to psychology what car-
bon’s making four bonds is to organic chemis-
try. In both cases, more fundamental explana-
tions can be found, but only by proceeding to 
a more basic science. Neuroscience or perhaps 
some level of psychology that doesn’t invoke 
intentional states will tell us more about how 
desire-belief relations are constituted, while 
atomic and chemical physics tell us more 
about why carbon makes four bonds. But no 
deeper laws are found within psychology and 
organic chemistry themselves. We discover 
the basic laws through inference to the best 
explanation of the data these sciences address. 
It would be a great theoretical advance to dis-
cover a simpler set of psychological laws ex-
plaining the desire-belief combination rules. 
But I don’t see how this can be done.   
King provides a deeply illuminating discus-
sion of why it’s hard for me to say more about 
what would and wouldn’t count as reasoning. 
I agree with her about nearly every detail, in-
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cluding her conclusion that some kind of 
speed-and-syntax account is my best option, 
at least as far as extensional adequacy is con-
cerned. She notes that this view isn’t without 
costs. Characterizing reasoning in terms of 
speed and syntax might allow wishful thinking 
to count as reasoning. The problem of how to 
classify wishful thinking is in fact what dis-
suaded me from attempting a more explicit 
account of reasoning in Humean Nature. 
Probably I should just say it’s bad reasoning, 
as she suggests.  
Fortunately, my campaign against cogni-
tivist internalists like Smith, Scanlon, and Kant 
doesn’t require an account of reasoning. This is 
why I don’t provide one. I’m happy to agree 
with them that if beliefs alone could directly 
motivate action or create new desires, that 
would count as reasoning. 
My objection is that humans can’t do this 
kind of reasoning. If angels exist, maybe they 
can, and maybe this angelic psychological 
process is the clearest case of reasoning in all 
God’s creation. But many mammals can’t do 
it, including humans. So if moral judgment 
requires the capacity for this kind of reason-
ing, humans can’t make moral judgments.  
But of course, humans can make moral 
judgments. So by modus tollens, moral judg-
ments aren’t beliefs which can by reasoning 
move us to act or generate new desires. And 
that entails the falsity of cognitivist internal-
ism as defended by Smith, Scanlon, and Kant. 
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